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Abstract
Background: High health care costs have led to an unprecedented number of policy proposals
to reform the United States health care system. Proponents of Medicare For All (M4A) argue that
a single-payer system would reduce costs by allowing the government to obtain better prices
from providers. M4A would have varying effects on sources of hospital revenue, increasing
some payment while decreasing others. This paper explores the differential effects of M4A on
hospital income.
Methods: This paper uses data from CMS’s Healthcare Cost Report Information System
(HCRIS) to create a baseline model reflecting hospital revenues and costs under current hospital
payment policy. Then, estimates from the literature are used to inform parameter of a
counterfactual model of hospital finances under M4A. Changes in hospital finances reflect
changes in costs associated with a simplified billing system, while changes in revenue arise from
using Medicare payment rates for patients covered by Medicaid, CHIP, commercial insurance,
and uninsured patients under current hospital payment policy.
Results: Under the M4A counterfactual, 33% of hospitals have positive net income from
services to patients, compared to the 38% with positive net income in the baseline model. Using
a multiple linear regression to analyze factors associates with change in hospital revenue, this
analysis finds that rural hospitals experience a 2.7% reduction in revenue under the
counterfactual while critical access hospitals experience a 31.6% increase. For-profit hospital
ownership is associated with an increase in revenue of 3.3% and government-owned hospitals
see an increase in revenue of 12.3% from the counterfactual policy. Finally, being a teaching
hospital is associated with a 4% increase in revenue.
Conclusion: This exercise finds that a single-payer system would have drastically different
effects on hospitals across the nation. While many hospitals would lose money, quite a few
would also earn more money. This contrasts with dire warnings about M4A being catastrophic
for hospital net income.
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Introduction
The United States spends more per capita on health care than any other nation in the world, yet
Americans experience large variations in health care quality and access across socioeconomic
status.i The passage of the Affordable Care Act rapidly expanded access to health insurance but
still left millions of Americans uninsured. Even as a higher proportion of Americans are
technically covered by health insurance, increasing insurance premiums have put a strain on
household finances.ii The disproportionately high price of health care drives a large part of the
outsized spending on health care and insurance in the United States.iii To combat this, some have
proposed transforming the United States health care system into a single-payer system, or
“Medicare For All” (M4A). Proponents of M4A argue that a single-payer system would help
reduce costs by allowing the payer, in this case the government, to obtain better prices from
providers, thereby reducing costs for the insured. As reduced payment from the insurer
necessarily translates to reduced income for providers, this paper explores the ramifications of
changing a hospital’s payer mix to M4A on hospital income. This question is even more relevant
given the coronavirus pandemic, as the government has taken on a higher percentage of hospital
payments through Medicare payments for the uninsured and increased Medicaid enrollment due
to unemployment.iv
As M4A became a key policy proposal for both Senators Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren,
many models have analyzed the effects this transformative policy would have on United States
health care spending overall.v While each model is built on varying assumptions gleaned from
the plans outlined in the candidates’ platforms and M4A bills, most models agree that spending
on hospital care would be drastically reduced. However, opponents of M4A argue that hospitals
would lose an untenable amount of money under M4A, leaving hospitals in rural areas and
safety-net hospitals without sustainable funding.vi Previous models have only superficially
analyzed the impact M4A would have at the level of hospital income, yet this information is
critical to the argument surrounding the costs and benefits of a single-payer health care system.
Understanding how variations in hospital attributes impact M4A’s effect on hospital incomes
would allow policymakers to better tailor their M4A policy proposals to maintain access for
patients across the United States. This paper replicates current hospital revenues and costs using
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Medicare cost report data, then adjusts these inputs using parameter estimates from the literature
to create a counterfactual model representing revenues and costs under a single-payer health care
system. This paper then analyzes the differential effects of a switch to M4A on hospitals,
exploring which hospital factors are associated with the biggest changes in revenue.

Setting and Data
Setting
Hospital care comprises the largest percentage (33%) of health care costs in the United States
and is often prohibitively expensive and opaque to patients.vii Despite the high prices charged to
payers, hospitals consistently defend the need for increasing charges, with the American Hospital
Association (AHA) reporting that one third of hospitals carry negative operating margins.viii
However, the AHA also reports that the aggregate total margin for hospitals is approximately
8%.ix While these reports do not conflict, they paint a murky picture of hospital financial status,
making it difficult to effectively parse hospital claims regarding payment adequacy. Despite this
ambiguity, the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services, and Congress use financial data reported by hospitals to set payment rates for
government-funded health insurance. However, these groups often also use continued patient
access as a measure of payment adequacy due to the lack of transparency in hospital cost and
revenue reporting, and have generally found that Medicare rates are adequate for most hospitals.x
The uncertainty about hospital financial status is largely due to relatively impenetrable hospital
accounting. Hospital-reported revenue is difficult to disentangle, as private insurance payments
are often closely guarded to maintain competition. Revenue cannot be deduced directly from
hospitals’ total net income, as those calculations include factors that are not directly associated
with patient care (e.g., interest on investments, purchase of new medical technology, hospital
remodeling).xi While hospitals do produce federally-required cost reports, hospital finances are
largely self-reported and hospitals have an economic incentive to understate earnings and
overstate uncompensated care in order to receive tax breaks and community funding. For
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example, a number of hospitals in the 2017 HCRIS data set reported net revenues from patients
smaller than the sum of revenue reported from each patient type. In our current health care
system, hospitals receive payment for patient care from many different sources. In this paper, I
focus on revenue from Medicare, Medicaid, the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP),
commercial insurance, and uninsured patients. Medicare, Medicaid, and CHIP are governmentfunded health insurances for people over the age of 65 or with specific disabilities, people with
low incomes, and children in low-income families, respectively. Commercial insurance refers to
insurance purchased privately by an individual or provided by an employer. Many hospitals also
receive additional payments from the federal government to buffer against excessive costs from
disproportionate share patients, bad debt (unpaid bills), and critical access hospitals. Moreover,
hospital costs are not defined in detail in publicly available data sets, making it difficult to tease
out differences in hospital efficiency and expenses. These factors combine to complicate
understanding the state of hospital finances and the effects that changes in payments would have
on hospital income.

Data
This model uses 2017 data from RAND’s Hospital Data tool. This application packages and
documents data from CMS’s Healthcare Cost Report Information System (HCRIS), which
includes cost report information from every hospital that accepts Medicare. The resulting dataset
contains over 1,000 variables, including “facility characteristics, utilization data, cost and
charges by cost center (in total and for Medicare), Medicare settlement data, financial statement
data…. and value-added fields derived from HCRIS data, such as measures of occupancy and
profitability.”xii RAND also created additional variables in the dataset based on the hospitalreported data to assist analysis, including estimated commercial revenues, estimated cost-tocharge ratios, and annualized versions of several variables.
The 2017 data cover 4,709 hospitals across all US states and territories, approximately 90% of
community hospitals.xiiixiv See Tables 1 through 3 for a breakdown of the hospitals by revenue,
income, and cost.
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Tables 1-3: Hospital-Reported and Baseline Model Finances

Research Design and Methods
This paper uses hospital cost and revenue data from HCRIS to estimate current hospital income
as well as a counterfactual consistent with a single-payer system. Specifically, I estimate how
different hospitals’ incomes would change under Medicare For All — reducing the number of
uninsured patients, bringing Medicaid and commercial insurance payments to the same payment
rate as Medicare reimbursement, and reducing administrative costs — where hospital payments
are those proposed in Senator Elizabeth Warren’s Medicare-For-All plan (i.e., 110% of current
Medicare payments).
The baseline model, which reflects hospital income under the current health care system, uses
hospital-reported and RAND-constructed revenues and costs to reproduce hospital-reported net
income, calibrating the model that will be used to forecast the effects of policy change. The
counterfactual model builds upon the baseline model, using estimates from the literature to
generate new revenues and costs that would occur if hospitals were all being paid Medicare rates.
These estimates include the difference between Medicaid payments or commercial insurance
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payments and Medicare payments to hospitals, the reduction of bad debt, and the reduction of
hospital administrative costs.
This paper focuses on analyzing different factors associated with changes in revenue or net
income. The basic formulas for these change variables can be found below, with DR indicating
change in revenue and DI indicating change in net income.
DRTotal = DRMedicaid and CHIP + DRCommercial Payers + DRUninsured Patients
DI = DRTotal - DOperating Expenses

Measuring Hospital Financial Performance Under Current Health Policy
The baseline model for hospital income uses values from patient services-related hospital
revenue and costs; that is, revenues and costs from direct patient care but not from the cafeteria,
gift shop, investments, etc. The basic formula for net income from patient services (I) is as
follows, with revenue sources indicated in subscripts:
I = (RevenueTraditional Medicare + RevenueMedicare Advantage + RevenueMedicaid and CHIP +
RevenueCommercial Payers + RevenueUninsured Patients) - Operating Expenses
For definitions and additional information on underlying variables, please see Appendix 1.

Medicare
Total Medicare revenue combines revenue from traditional Medicare based on hospital-reported
values for Medicare outpatient revenue and Medicare inpatient revenue and Medicare Advantage
using the RAND-created variable representing the “estimate of revenues for services (inpatient
plus outpatient) provided to enrollees in Medicare Advantage plans.”xv
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Commercial Insurance
RAND’s variable for “estimated revenues from commercial payers, i.e. net patient revenues
minus revenues from Medicare (fee-for-service plus estimated Medicare Advantage), Medicaid,
SCHIP, state/local indigent” captures commercial revenue.

Medicaid and CHIP
Revenue from Medicaid and CHIP is estimated from the sum of hospital-reported variables for
revenues from Medicaid and stand-alone CHIP programs.

Uninsured Patients
The model estimates “Revenue from Uninsured Patients” as the values from “net patient revenue
(charges minus contractual allowances and discounts)” minus revenue from traditional Medicare,
Medicare Advantage, Medicaid, CHIP, and commercial payers. This formula mimics RAND’s
methodology for developing their commercial revenue estimate from the HCRIS data.xvi
For each of the above variables, blank entries were recoded as zeroes. This assumes that
hospitals choosing not to report revenue in a particular area had zero revenue of that type to
report. As hospital cost reports are audited by CMS, and RAND cleaned up many variables for
their HCRIS data set, it seems unlikely that many hospitals would leave fields completely blank
in order to underreport revenue.

Total Net Income
The total revenue variable for each hospital in the baseline model sums revenue from traditional
Medicare, Medicare Advantage, Medicaid, CHIP, commercial payers, and uninsured patients. In
order to find net income from services to patients, I subtracted hospital-reported total operating
expenses from total revenue. The estimates from this baseline model closely match hospitalreported net income from services to patients, moving approximately dollar for dollar with
hospital-reported income (adjusted R2=0.968; see Appendix 2).
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Measuring Hospital Financial Performance Under a Single-Payer Model
Medicare For All
Single-payer proponents have offered a series of Medicare for All proposals over the past several
years, differing both in content and in the level of detail offered.xvii No plan thus far has been
detailed enough to receive a score from the Congressional Budget Office, leaving a great deal of
ambiguity in what M4A would mean for provider payment.xviii Luckily, commercial and state
payers have recently begun adopting hospital payment systems based on Medicare payment, and
most M4A plans discuss M4A hospital payments as being an increased version of current
Medicare payments.
The M4A proposal used for this counterfactual is loosely based on Senator Elizabeth Warren’s
single-payer plan, which proposes paying hospitals at 110% of current Medicare fee-for-service
payment rates to help maintain hospital incomes.xix While the Warren M4A plan completely
eliminates patient-side cost-sharing, cost-sharing is an effective tool that insurance plans use to
reduce moral hazard or overuse of health care. Eliminating cost-sharing completely would likely
introduce substantial changes in demand for health care services, leading to an increase in the
number of services provided by hospitals. Such analysis is beyond the scope of this paper. The
counterfactual therefore assumes that cost-sharing would continue to exist under a new plan, but
would be similar to Medicare rates. This model assumes no private supplemental health
insurance. For simplicity, the model also assumes no patient demand response to any other
changes.
The counterfactual model of hospital income under a single-payer system builds upon the
baseline model of current hospital payment policy, bringing all revenue to the level it would be
under 110% of current Medicare payment rates. The formula for net income from patient
services under the single-payer model (ISingle Payer) is as follows, with revenue sources indicated in
subscripts:
ISingle Payer = ((RevenueTraditional Medicare + RevenueMedicare Advantage + New RevenueBaseline Medicaid & CHIP
Patients

+ New RevenueBaseline Commercial Patients + New RevenueBaseline Uninsured Patients +
11

New RevenueBaseline Bad Debt) x 110%) - Adjusted Operating Expenses

Medicare
Medicare revenues in the single-payer model are unchanged from the basic model. I use
traditional Medicare as the payment level to which all other sources of revenue should be
adjusted under a single-payer, “Medicare-For-All” system. As hospital payments for care from
Medicare Advantage plans have been shown to be roughly equal to payments from traditional
Medicare,xx the single-payer model does not adjust revenue from Medicare Advantage.

Commercial Insurance
A 2017 RAND analysis found that, on average, commercial insurers paid 2.41 times what
traditional Medicare paid for the same services.xxi In order to bring commercial revenues in line
with Medicare payments, I divide commercial revenues from the basic model by 2.41.

Medicaid and CHIP
The Medicaid and CHIP Payment and Access Commission estimates that Medicaid pays
hospitals 78% of Medicare rates, excluding DSH payments.xxii Of the hospitals that completed
the cost report field asking whether their Medicaid payments included DSH payments, most
reported that their Medicaid revenues did not include DSH payments. Thus, I divide baseline
Medicaid revenue by 0.78 to approximate revenue from these patients under single-payer. As
Medicaid and CHIP pay approximately the same rates to hospitals, the same formula is used for
a combined Medicaid and CHIP variable.

Uninsured Patients
HCRIS provides only limited data on hospital costs and revenues from services to uninsured
patients. In order to determine revenue from these patients under a single-payer system, I
translated the costs of treating uninsured patients to revenues using the hospitals’ cost to charge
ratio and revenue to charge ratio, as follows:
RevenuePreviously Uninsured Patients =

!
"#$%&%#& "()*+, -)%.#
"#$% #/ ")*, /#* 01.1$2*,3 4)%.,1%$

∗Medicare Revenue-to-Charge Ratio
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To determine cost, I first isolated costs from all inpatient, ancillary, and outpatient centers, which
I identified as costs from services to patients. For hospitals with this subtotal missing, I divided
hospitals into subtypes based on whether they are located in rural or urban zip codes, then further
divided hospitals based on ownership, i.e. for-profit, non-profit, or government-owned. For each
hospital subtype, I calculated the median percent of operating costs attributed to inpatient,
ancillary, and outpatient centers. I then multiplied this percent by the total operating expenses
for the hospital.
I then determined costs for each payer type. A single variable for traditional Medicare costs is
defined as the sum of Medicare outpatient and inpatient costs, including organ acquisition.
Medicare Advantage costs were derived using a RAND-created “estimate of billed charges for
services (inpatient plus outpatient) provided to enrollees in Medicare Advantage plans” variable
multiplied by the hospital’s cost-to-charge ratio to determine cost. For hospitals with missing
cost-to-charge ratios, the median for their hospital subtype was substituted in.
Similarly, costs for services to patients with commercial insurance were estimated using
RAND’s “estimated charges from commercial payers” variable multiplied by the hospital’s costto-charge ratio. Hospitals report their Medicaid and CHIP costs through HCRIS, so no adaptation
was needed. In order to determine the cost of care for uninsured patients, I subtracted the cost of
care for patients with traditional Medicare, Medicare Advantage, Medicaid, CHIP, and
commercial insurance from the total cost of patient care at each hospital. Zeroes were substituted
in for hospitals with negative revenues from uninsured patients. I then found the revenue under
Medicare payment rates by estimating charges based on cost and multiplying by the hospital’s
Medicare revenue-to-charge ratio. For hospitals with missing revenue-to-charge ratios, I
substituted in the hospital subtype’s median.

Bad Debt
This model assumes that some new income from bad debt in the baseline will be added to
hospital revenues, as more patients are covered by insurance. To determine revenue from bad
debt (R Proportional Bad Debt), I translated bad debt in the baseline model into revenue and
proportional bad debt in the counterfactual, as follows:
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R Medicare Bad Debt = (𝑁𝑜𝑛 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝐵𝑎𝑑 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 × 𝑈𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜) ×
𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜

R Proportional Bad Debt = R Medicare Bad Debt × 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐵𝑎𝑑 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑒
First, I derived the cost of non-Medicare and non-reimbursable bad debt using the charges
multiplied by the hospital’s cost-to-charge ratio for uncompensated care. I then divided the cost
of non-Medicare bad debt by the hospital’s cost-to-charge ratio to determine new charges. Next,
I multiplied the charges for non-Medicare bad debt by the hospital’s Medicare revenue-to-charge
ratio to obtain Medicare reimbursement for these services. While many current Medicare for All
plans promise to eliminate cost-sharing, my single-payer model assumes that bad debt would still
occur at the same rate it currently does for patients with Medicare. Therefore, I calculated the
percentage of Medicare charges that are bad debt by dividing Medicare bad debts by the sum of
Medicare bad debt and Medicare revenue. I then multiplied this percentage by the amount
Medicare would reimburse for hospital bad debt to determine the share of non-Medicare bad debt
that would still be unpaid under a single-payer system. Finally, I subtracted the share of nonMedicare bad debt that would still be unpaid from total Medicare reimbursement for nonMedicare bad debt, revealing the total reimbursement that would occur for non-Medicare bad
debt that occurred in the baseline model under a single-payer system.

Administrative Costs
One large potential benefit of a single-payer plan is a reduction in administrative costs. Several
analyses have found that the current multi-payer system accounts for approximately 50% of
current administrative costs for hospitals.xxiii To reflect this reduction in costs, this model
subtracts 50% of administrative costs from hospital-reported operating expenses to form the
counterfactual operating expenses.

Total Net Income
Total revenue for hospitals under single-payer is constructed by bringing the above variables
together. This model assumes the M4A plan would pay hospitals at 110% of current Medicare
rates, so I use a multiplier across revenue streams to account for this increased payment. To
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calculate M4A net income, I subtract the reduced operating expenses from total revenue under
the counterfactual.
Revenue Source

Revenue Under Current Policy

Revenue Under M4A

Medicare

Traditional Medicare Inpatient +
Traditional Medicare Outpatient
+ Medicare Advantage

(Traditional Medicare Inpatient + Traditional
Medicare Outpatient + Medicare Advantage)
* 1.1

Medicaid &
CHIP

Medicaid + CHIP

((Medicaid + CHIP)/ .78) * 1.1

Commercial

RAND-Estimated Commercial

(Commercial/ 2.41) * 1.1

Uninsured

Net Patient Revenue (Medicare + Medicaid + CHIP
+ Commercial Revenue)

((1/ (Cost-to-Charge Ratio/ Cost of Care to
Uninsured Patients)) *
Medicare Revenue-to-Charge Ratio) * 1.1

Bad Debt

Hospital-Reported Bad Debt

1.Non-Medicare Bad Debt * Uncompensated
Care Cost-to-Charge Ratio = Non-Medicare
Bad Debt Cost
2. Non-Medicare Bad Debt Cost * Medicare
Revenue-to-Charge Ratio = New Revenue
3. New Revenue - (New Revenue *
Percentage Paid by Medicare) = New
Revenue from Previous Bad Debt
4. New Revenue from Previous Bad Debt *
1.1

Changes in Hospital Finances
In this section, I present the results of my analysis. For this analysis, I focused on how hospital
incomes and revenues changed under M4A, both in dollar terms and as a percent of previous
income or revenue, respectively. First, I present the summary statistics of changes in revenue and
net income, both in dollar amounts and as a percentage of initial revenue or net income,
respectively. Next, I present the results of a multivariable regression analysis that explores which
hospital characteristics are associated with the greatest gains and losses from a switch to M4A. I
15

then present a figure and statistics showing the variation in average effect size and direction of
change from M4A for hospitals in different income quartiles under current hospital payment
policy. Finally, I describe the different effects M4A would have on hospitals in each state.
Table 4: Changes in Hospital Finances

Note. Change in revenue was calculated by subtracting revenue from services to patients under current hospital payment policy
from hospital revenue under M4A. Change in revenue as a percent was calculated by dividing the change in hospital revenue by
initial revenue. Change in net income was calculated by subtracting net income from services to patients under current hospital
payment policy from hospital net income under M4A. Change in net income as a percent was calculated by dividing the change
in hospital net income by initial net income.

Under the M4A counterfactual, 33% (1050) of hospitals have positive net income from services
to patients, compared to the 38% (1323) with positive net income in the baseline model. The
large changes in revenue and net income, however, indicate that while a similar proportion of
hospitals have positive net incomes, the “winners” and “losers” may not all be the same, and the
magnitude of change differs across hospital characteristics.
Table 4 presents the change in revenue and net income as both a dollar amount and as a percent
change (i.e., relative to baseline revenue or income), as the latter allows for easier comparison
across large and small hospitals. Under the counterfactual, the average hospital’s revenue was
reduced by 16%, with a standard deviation of 35%. While the percentage differences for revenue
changes are not overly large, the dollar amounts vary widely. The average change in revenue for
hospitals is a reduction of about $10.5 million, with a standard deviation of almost $27 million.
Interestingly, the average hospital’s net income decreased 39%, with a standard deviation of
2.29%. Hospital net income is more sensitive to change in the payer system than hospital
revenue is, as the denominator is substantially smaller for the calculation of change in net
∆ UVW XYZ[\V

income, |UVW XYZ[\V ^Y _`aVb^YV c[dVb| with net income in the baseline model between approximately
-$6 million (25th pct.) and $6 million (75th pct.) compared to $25 million (25th pct.) and $230
million (75th pct.) for revenue (see Table 1). To create more conservative analyses, I removed
16

hospitals whose changes in net income represented extreme outliers from the final data set used
for analysis. The average change in net income under the counterfactual is a reduction of about
$4 million, with a standard deviation of approximately $17.5 million. These are not small
numbers, but it should be noted that these outcomes only reflect changes in revenue and income
from services to patients, which would leave other revenue sources for the hospitals unchanged.

Table 5: Regression Analysis of Factors Associated with Change in Revenue

Beyond describing overall trends in revenue change, multivariable regression analysis explores
which hospital characteristics are associated with the greatest gains and losses from a switch to
M4A. This paper uses a multiple linear regression to assess the relationship between whether a
hospital is rural, government-owned, for-profit, critical access, or a teaching hospital and the
hospital’s change in revenue (%) under the counterfactual. Rural hospitals experience a small
(2.7%) reduction in revenue under the counterfactual, significant at the 0.05 level. Critical access
17

hospitals experience a 31.6% increase in revenue under the counterfactual, significant at the 0.01
level. For-profit hospital ownership is associated with an increase in revenue of 3.3%, significant
at the 0.05 level. Government-owned hospitals stand to gain an increase in revenue of 12.3%
from the counterfactual policy, significant at the 0.01 level. Finally, being a teaching hospital
(either major or minor, as defined by the number of students) was associated with a 4% increase
in revenue, significant at the 0.01 level. The adjusted R-squared for this model is 0.195,
accounting for a surprisingly substantial amount of the change in revenue. The F-statistic for this
model is also significant at the 0.01 level. Single variable regressions assessing the relationship
between individual variables and change in revenue can be found in Appendices 3-8.

Figure 1: Differences in Changes in Net Income for Hospitals

Note. This figure depicts the average change in income for hospitals, separated by hospital net income under current hospital
payment policy. Income Quartile 4 reflects the average net income for hospitals with the highest net income, continuing in
descending order of net income to Quartile 1. The orange point represents average income under current hospital payment policy,
while the blue point represents average income under M4A.

18

While hospitals on average lose money under the counterfactual, changes in net income from
services to patients do not affect wealthy and poorer hospitals equally. The highest margin
hospitals, in the top quartile of net income under current policy, experience the largest decrease
in net income under the counterfactual policy. The top quartile’s average (mean) net income
under current policy is $24,199,589, while under the counterfactual it would decrease to
$1,982,721. The third quartile experiences a much smaller change under the counterfactual,
moving from an average net income of $905,909 to a counterfactual average net income of $1,026,224. The second lowest quartile also experiences a small change under the counterfactual,
increasing from an average net income of -$3,353,935 to an average net income of -$2,859,218.
Finally, the lowest-income quartile experiences an average reduction in net income, as well, with
an average net income under current policy at -$27,751,111 and an average net income under the
counterfactual of -$34,972,104.

Figure 2: Change in Hospital Revenue by State

This analysis also worked to assess how individual states might be differentially impacted by a
M4A policy. Under the counterfactual, eight states have hospitals with a positive change in
revenue, on average. These “winners” are Kansas, Nebraska, Idaho, Iowa, Montana, South
Dakota, Oklahoma, and Texas. All other states and territories experience an average negative
change in hospital revenue under the counterfactual M4A model. The state with the largest
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percent reduction in revenue under the counterfactual is Alaska, with an average 25.7% decrease
in revenue. Kansas’s hospitals experience the largest percent increase in revenue, with an
average increase of 24.5%. See Appendix 10 for table.

Discussion
Switching to a single-payer, Medicare For All system in the United States would represent a
drastic change to the payment system for health care. Proponents of M4A assert that the system
would increase access and decrease morbidity and mortality, all at a relatively low cost.xxiv
Critics, on the other hand, argue that a single-payer plan would drastically reduce access and lead
to unnecessary spending.xxv This analysis presents the effects that a higher proportion of patients
being covered by Medicare, or a similar government-funded plan, would have on hospital
finances.
This modeling exercise finds that a single-payer system would have drastically different effects
on hospitals across the nation. While many hospitals would lose money, quite a few would also
earn more money. The different ratios of payers for each hospital contributes to differences in
revenue change, while varying hospital administrative and operating costs affect M4A’s impact
on hospital costs. Combined, these factors have a push and pull effect on net income, increasing
net income for some hospitals while reducing it for others. Hospitals with a large share of bad
debt, patients with Medicaid, and patients who are uninsured stand to gain much more in a
single-payer system. Additionally, all hospitals could potentially streamline processes and
eliminate administrative waste by switching to M4A. Hospitals with predominantly
commercially-insured patients, on the other hand, are more likely to have reduced income under
M4A, given the high prices commercial insurances pay hospitals compared to Medicare
payments. If a reduction in income is the main reason hospitals might oppose a single-payer
system, an increase in income might reduce opposition to M4A from a hospital cost perspective.
In addition to providing health insurance to people who are currently not covered, the M4A
counterfactual shows a redistributive pattern among hospital incomes. If these redistributive
effects protect access to care across geography, these effects may help rebut arguments that
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Medicare For All would have devastating impacts on hospitals that remain open to provide a
public service. The hospitals with the highest incomes now would be the most negatively
affected by M4A, while hospitals with income close to zero would be affected only minorly.
This model shows, on average, a reduction in income for the lowest-income hospitals, but
identifying this trend allows policymakers to account for this outcome when more precisely
laying out a M4A policy. Moreover, the M4A counterfactual shows an increase in revenue for
critical access hospitals, who currently rely on very thin margins but receive additional funding
from the federal government in order to stay open in areas of need.xxvi Being a teaching hospital
is also associated with an increase in revenue from services to patients under the counterfactual
policy. Teaching hospitals are another group that receive additional funding from the federal
government in order to provide a public good. This suggests that some of the funding to cover
the increase in payments from the federal government under a single-payer plan may be able to
come from a similar line item that already exists. From an equity perspective, M4A therefore has
the potential to drastically improve the US hospital care system.
Government ownership of hospitals is associated with a significant increase in revenue from
services to patients, as well, which may imply a similar redistributive financing possibility.
Interestingly, for-profit hospital ownership is also associated with a small increase in hospital
revenue, compared to non-profit hospitals, which would seem to be a point against the singlepayer financing system improving equity. Many health services researchers have noted, however,
that non-profit hospitals are not significantly different in pricing or operation from for-profit
hospitals, despite their tax status.xxvii This may also be a response to geographic variation in
hospital regulation, which in some states disincentivizes for-profit hospital ownership.xxviii
Interestingly, most non-profit hospitals are able to maintain their tax-free status by donating the
cost of care for people who are not able to afford it. If the number of uninsured people and the
amount of bad debt were to drastically reduce under M4A, non-profit hospitals would need to
construct another way to contribute community benefit. This is a potentially important
implication for hospitals preparing their financial plans.
This analysis has several key limitations. Focusing on the data, ambiguity in HCRIS’s directions
on how to fill out the forms may lead to inconsistencies in reporting between hospitals;
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incomplete data raises concerns about representativeness (as several hospitals reported zero
revenue from services to patients and therefore could not be included in the model); and
reporting hospitals may not be selected at random, reducing the generalizability of the model.
Additionally, administrative and other cost data are difficult to disentangle as they are reported in
large blocks rather than individual line items. As hospitals have an incentive to understate
earnings and overstate provision of uncompensated care in order to receive tax breaks and
community funding, there are potential concerns about misreporting as well. Similarly, data for
commercially-insured and uninsured patients are estimated based on hospital-reports, potentially
introducing additional imprecision.
A second set of limitations relates to the single-payer model more generally. Specifically, while
this model is primarily based on hospital-reported cost and revenue data, many of the changes
that would be made under a M4A plan are unclear at this point. While multipliers used here are
drawn from the literature, these are subject to change. The results of this model rely heavily on
the assumption that M4A will pay 110% of current Medicare payments. Additionally, the
multipliers used to determine changes in Medicaid, CHIP, and commercial insurance payment to
hospitals are derived from the literature and generalized, as costs and revenues were not broken
down by service provided or by state variation in payment. The estimate for reduction in hospital
spending on billing and related services under M4A is drawn from work comparing hospital
billing in the United States with billing in Canada, and may not represent the range of possible
changes in operating expenses. See Appendix 11 for a one-way sensitivity analysis of the model
parameters.
Finally, this model does not account for changes in demand for hospital care, which might arise
as a result of increased access to health insurance. Similarly, it does not address differences
between patients who currently are insured through different types of plans, whether related to
health status, cost profiles, or individual demand for medical care. Additionally, this model does
not account for changes in costs related to payment of hospital employees, including nurses and
other staff, or reduced pharmaceutical prices.
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This model does not have the granularity to make accurate predictions about what would happen
to an individual hospital under the counterfactual M4A plan. It can, however, provide insight on
general trends that Americans might expect to see under such a policy. This work contributes to
the ongoing discussion about what a single-payer health care system would look like for health
care providers, illustrating the complexities of predicting opposition to such a system. To my
knowledge, this would be the first model to assess overall benefits and distributional effects of
M4A on hospitals. It reveals that the prediction of M4A opponents that a deluge of hospitals
would go into bankruptcy under a single-payer system may be false. However, while some
hospitals may benefit from increased revenue and decreased costs under a single-payer system,
policymakers should take care to address the inequities in which communities and individual
hospitals are likely to experience negative shocks. Future research in this area should include
more detailed assessments of the correlates to change in income and consider predicted changes
in demand for hospital care under M4A.

23

APPENDIX

24

Appendix 1: RAND HCRIS variables
Variable Name
critical_access_hosp_pos
ownership_forprofit
ownership_government
ownership_nonprofit
operating_margin
admin_cost_share
admin_cost_share_inclmixed
admin_costs
ownership_forprofit
ownership_government
ownership_nonprofit
operating_expenses
operating_revenues
other_expenses_all
total_salaries
net_income
net_income_srvcs_patients
net_income_srvcs_patients_other
net_patient_rev
total_margin
mdcr_inpat_cost_to_charge_ratio
mdcr_inpat_costreim_acute_cost
mdcr_inpat_costreim_costsrvcs

Definition
Hospital is a Critical Access Hospital (CAH) (Y/N) (as
reported in Provider of Services file)
[critical_access_hosp_pos]
Ownership: Proprietary (for-profit)
[ownership_forprofit]
Ownership: Governmental [ownership_government]
Ownership: Voluntary (non-profit)
[ownership_nonprofit]
Operating margin [operating_margin]
Administrative costs (admin and general + nursing
admin + medical records) as a share of reimbursable net
expenses [admin_cost_share]
Administrative costs (including share of mixed
categories) as a share of administrative, clinical, and
mixed activities [admin_cost_share_inclmixed]
Administrative costs (admin and general + nursing
admin + medical records) [admin_costs]
Ownership: Proprietary (for-profit)
[ownership_forprofit]
Ownership: Governmental [ownership_government]
Ownership: Voluntary (non-profit)
[ownership_nonprofit]
Operating expenses [operating_expenses]
Operating revenues [operating_revenues]
Expenses in providing services other than to patients
[other_expenses_all]
Total salaries [total_salaries]
Net income (or loss) for the cost reporting period
[net_income]
Net income from services to patients
[net_income_srvcs_patients]
Net income from services to patients plus other income
[net_income_srvcs_patients_other]
Net patient revenue (charges minus contractual
allowances and discounts) [net_patient_rev]
Total margin [total_margin]
Medicare inpatient cost-to-charge ratio
[mdcr_inpat_cost_to_charge_ratio]
Medicare inpatient acute costs
[mdcr_inpat_costreim_acute_cost]
Medicare inpatient under cost reimbursement, costs of
covered services [mdcr_inpat_costreim_costsrvcs]
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mdcr_inpat_costreim_primpayer

Medicare inpatient under cost reimbursement, primary
payer payments [mdcr_inpat_costreim_primpayer]
mdcr_inpat_costs
Total Medicare inpatient operating costs
[mdcr_inpat_costs]
mdcr_inpat_margin
Medicare inpatient margin [mdcr_inpat_margin]
mdcr_inpat_pps_pymts
Medicare inpatient payments under prospective
payment system [mdcr_inpat_pps_pymts]
mdcr_inpat_revs
Medicare inpatient revenues [mdcr_inpat_revs]
mdcr_margin
Medicare margin (inpatient plus outpatient)
[mdcr_margin]
mdcr_outpat_charges
Medicare outpatient charges [mdcr_outpat_charges]
mdcr_outpat_cost_to_charge_ratio Medicare outpatient cost-to-charge ratio
[mdcr_outpat_cost_to_charge_ratio]
mdcr_outpat_costs
Medicare outpatient costs [mdcr_outpat_costs]
mdcr_outpat_lesser_costchg
Medicare outpatient, lesser of costs or charges
[mdcr_outpat_lesser_costchg]
mdcr_outpat_margin
Medicare outpatient margin [mdcr_outpat_margin]
mdcr_outpat_pps_pymts
Medicare outpatient payments under prospective
payment [mdcr_outpat_pps_pymts]
mdcr_outpat_revs
Medicare outpatient revenues [mdcr_outpat_revs]
mdcr_reimb_bad_debt
Medicare allowable bad debts, Observation Beds (see
instructions) [mdcr_reimb_bad_debt]
pctg_mdcd_days_to_inpat_days
Disproportionate share (DSH) adjustment, Percentage
of Medicaid patient days to total days reported on
Worksheet S-3, Part I [pctg_mdcd_days_to_inpat_days]
pctg_ssi_days_to_mdcr_partA_days Disproportionate share (DSH) adjustment, Percentage
of SSI recipient patient days to Medicare Part A patient
days [pctg_ssi_days_to_mdcr_partA_days]
gross_patient_rev
Total patient revenues (gross, i.e. charges)
[gross_patient_rev]
mdcr_adv_charges_est
Estimate of billed charges for services (inpatient plus
outpatient) provided to enrollees in Medicare
Advantage plans [mdcr_adv_charges_est]
mdcr_adv_rev_est
Estimate of revenues for services (inpatient plus
outpatient) provided to enrollees in Medicare
Advantage plans [mdcr_adv_rev_est]
mdcr_inpat_charges
Medicare inpatient charges [mdcr_inpat_charges]
mdcr_rev_to_charges
Medicare revenue-to-charge ratio
[mdcr_rev_to_charges]
commercial_charges_est
Estimated charges from commercial payers, i.e. net
patient revenues minus revenues from Medicare (feefor-service plus estimated Medicare Advantage),
Medicaid, SCHIP, state/local indigent (2552-10 only)
[commercial_charges_est]
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commercial_rev_est

Estimated revenues from commercial payers, i.e. net
patient revenues minus revenues from Medicare (feefor-service plus estimated Medicare Advantage),
Medicaid, SCHIP, state/local indigent (2552-10 only)
[commercial_rev_est]
commercial_rev_to_charges_est
Estimated commercial revenue-to-charge ratio (2552-10
only) [commercial_rev_to_charges_est]
commercial_to_mdcr_est
Ratio of estimated commercial revenue-to-charge ratio
to Medicare revenue-to-charge ratio (2552-10 only)
[commercial_to_mdcr_est]
Medicare bad debts for the entire hospital complex
mdcr_baddebt_hospcmplx_only10
(2552-10 only) [mdcr_baddebt_hospcmplx_only10]
Medicare allowable bad debts for the entire hospital
complex (2552-10 only)
mdcr_baddebt_ln2701_only10
[mdcr_baddebt_ln2701_only10]
Cost of non-Medicare bad debt expense (2552-10 only)
nonmdcr_baddebt_costs_only10
[nonmdcr_baddebt_costs_only10]
Non-Medicare and non-reimbursable bad debt expense
nonmdcr_baddebt_hospcmplx_only10 (2552-10 only) [nonmdcr_baddebt_hospcmplx_only10]
Cost of non-Medicare Uncompensated care, Medicaid,
and SCHIP (2552-10 only)
nonmdcr_uncomp_costs_only10
[nonmdcr_uncomp_costs_only10]
Other Uncompensated care, Medicaid, and SCHIP
charges (2552-96 only)
other_uncomp_care_charges_only96 [other_uncomp_care_charges_only96]
Uncompensated care, Medicaid, and SCHIP cost (2552other_uncomp_care_cost_only96
96 only) [other_uncomp_care_cost_only96]
Private grants, donations, or endowment income
restricted to funding charity care (2552-10 only)
priv_grants_for_charity_only10
[priv_grants_for_charity_only10]
Partial payment by patients approved for charity care
pymt_charity_patients_only10
(2552-10 only) [pymt_charity_patients_only10]
Partial payment by insured patients approved for charity
pymt_insured_charity_only10
care (2552-10 only) [pymt_insured_charity_only10]
Partial payment by uninsured patients approved for
charity care (2552-10 only)
pymt_uninsured_charity_only10
[pymt_uninsured_charity_only10]
Did hospital receive DSH or supplemental payments
from Medicaid? (Y/N) (2552-10 only)
receives_mdcd_DSH_YN_only10
[receives_mdcd_DSH_YN_only10]
Gross Medicaid Revenues (2552-96 only)
revs_uncomp_gross_mdcd_only96
[revs_uncomp_gross_mdcd_only96]
Non-restricted grants for Uncompensated care,
Medicaid, and SCHIP (2552-96 only)
revs_uncomp_nonrstrgrants_only96 [revs_uncomp_nonrstrgrants_only96]
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Revenues from Uncompensated care, Medicaid, and
SCHIP (2552-96 only) [revs_uncomp_only96]
Restricted grants for Uncompensated care, Medicaid,
and SCHIP (2552-96 only)
revs_uncomp_rstrgrants_only96
[revs_uncomp_rstrgrants_only96]
Revenues related to SCHIP (2552-96 only)
revs_uncomp_schip_only96
[revs_uncomp_schip_only96]
Revenues from State and local indigent care programs
revs_uncomp_stloc_indig_only96
(2552-96 only) [revs_uncomp_stloc_indig_only96]
Total Gross Uncompensated care, Medicaid, and SCHIP
revs_uncomp_total_only96
Revenues (2552-96 only) [revs_uncomp_total_only96]
schip_charges
Stand-alone SCHIP charges [schip_charges]
schip_costs
Stand-alone SCHIP cost [schip_costs]
Net revenue from stand-alone SCHIP (2552-10 only)
schip_net_revenue_only10
[schip_net_revenue_only10]
Difference between net revenue and costs for standalone SCHIP (2552-10 only)
schip_uncomp_care_only10
[schip_uncomp_care_only10]
Charges for patients covered under state or local
stloc_indigent_charges
indigent care program [stloc_indigent_charges]
State or local indigent care program cost
stloc_indigent_costs
[stloc_indigent_costs]
Net revenue from state or local indigent care program
stloc_indigent_net_rev_only10
(2552-10 only) [stloc_indigent_net_rev_only10]
Difference between net revenue and costs for state or
local indigent care program (2552-10 only)
stloc_indigent_uncomp_only10
[stloc_indigent_uncomp_only10]
Cost of charity care (2552-10 only)
uncomp_charity_patients_only10
[uncomp_charity_patients_only10]
Cost of charity care for insured patients (2552-10 only)
uncomp_insured_charity_only10
[uncomp_insured_charity_only10]
Cost of charity care for uninsured patients (2552-10
uncomp_uninsured_charity_only10
only) [uncomp_uninsured_charity_only10]
Total unreimbursed and Uncompensated care, Medicaid,
and SCHIP cost (2552-10 only)
unreimb_uncomp_costs_only10
[unreimb_uncomp_costs_only10]
Medicare bad debts for the entire hospital complex
mdcr_baddebt_hospcmplx_only10
(2552-10 only) [mdcr_baddebt_hospcmplx_only10]
Medicare allowable bad debts for the entire hospital
complex (2552-10 only)
mdcr_baddebt_ln2701_only10
[mdcr_baddebt_ln2701_only10]
Cost of non-Medicare bad debt expense (2552-10 only)
nonmdcr_baddebt_costs_only10
[nonmdcr_baddebt_costs_only10]
Non-Medicare and non-reimbursable bad debt expense
nonmdcr_baddebt_hospcmplx_only10 (2552-10 only) [nonmdcr_baddebt_hospcmplx_only10]
revs_uncomp_only96
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nonmdcr_uncomp_costs_only10
other_uncomp_care_charges_only96
other_uncomp_care_cost_only96
priv_grants_for_charity_only10
pymt_charity_patients_only10
pymt_insured_charity_only10
pymt_uninsured_charity_only10
receives_mdcd_DSH_YN_only10
revs_uncomp_gross_mdcd_only96
revs_uncomp_nonrstrgrants_only96
revs_uncomp_only96
revs_uncomp_rstrgrants_only96
revs_uncomp_schip_only96
revs_uncomp_stloc_indig_only96
revs_uncomp_total_only96
schip_charges
schip_costs
schip_net_revenue_only10
schip_uncomp_care_only10

Cost of non-Medicare Uncompensated care, Medicaid,
and SCHIP (2552-10 only)
[nonmdcr_uncomp_costs_only10]
Other Uncompensated care, Medicaid, and SCHIP
charges (2552-96 only)
[other_uncomp_care_charges_only96]
Uncompensated care, Medicaid, and SCHIP cost (255296 only) [other_uncomp_care_cost_only96]
Private grants, donations, or endowment income
restricted to funding charity care (2552-10 only)
[priv_grants_for_charity_only10]
Partial payment by patients approved for charity care
(2552-10 only) [pymt_charity_patients_only10]
Partial payment by insured patients approved for charity
care (2552-10 only) [pymt_insured_charity_only10]
Partial payment by uninsured patients approved for
charity care (2552-10 only)
[pymt_uninsured_charity_only10]
Did hospital receive DSH or supplemental payments
from Medicaid? (Y/N) (2552-10 only)
[receives_mdcd_DSH_YN_only10]
Gross Medicaid Revenues (2552-96 only)
[revs_uncomp_gross_mdcd_only96]
Non-restricted grants for Uncompensated care,
Medicaid, and SCHIP (2552-96 only)
[revs_uncomp_nonrstrgrants_only96]
Revenues from Uncompensated care, Medicaid, and
SCHIP (2552-96 only) [revs_uncomp_only96]
Restricted grants for Uncompensated care, Medicaid,
and SCHIP (2552-96 only)
[revs_uncomp_rstrgrants_only96]
Revenues related to SCHIP (2552-96 only)
[revs_uncomp_schip_only96]
Revenues from State and local indigent care programs
(2552-96 only) [revs_uncomp_stloc_indig_only96]
Total Gross Uncompensated care, Medicaid, and SCHIP
Revenues (2552-96 only) [revs_uncomp_total_only96]
Stand-alone SCHIP charges [schip_charges]
Stand-alone SCHIP cost [schip_costs]
Net revenue from stand-alone SCHIP (2552-10 only)
[schip_net_revenue_only10]
Difference between net revenue and costs for standalone SCHIP (2552-10 only)
[schip_uncomp_care_only10]
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stloc_indigent_charges
stloc_indigent_costs
stloc_indigent_net_rev_only10
stloc_indigent_uncomp_only10
uncomp_charity_patients_only10
uncomp_insured_charity_only10
uncomp_uninsured_charity_only10
unreimb_uncomp_costs_only10
costs_subtotal
costs_total
net_expenses_total
net_expenses_admin_and_general
inpat_costs
inpat_totcosts
outpat_costs
outpat_totcosts
ccr_subtotal

Charges for patients covered under state or local
indigent care program [stloc_indigent_charges]
State or local indigent care program cost
[stloc_indigent_costs]
Net revenue from state or local indigent care program
(2552-10 only) [stloc_indigent_net_rev_only10]
Difference between net revenue and costs for state or
local indigent care program (2552-10 only)
[stloc_indigent_uncomp_only10]
Cost of charity care (2552-10 only)
[uncomp_charity_patients_only10]
Cost of charity care for insured patients (2552-10 only)
[uncomp_insured_charity_only10]
Cost of charity care for uninsured patients (2552-10
only) [uncomp_uninsured_charity_only10]
Total unreimbursed and Uncompensated care, Medicaid,
and SCHIP cost (2552-10 only)
[unreimb_uncomp_costs_only10]
Costs, Subtotal (all inpatient, ancillary, and outpatient
centers) [costs_subtotal]
Costs,Total (all inpatient, ancillary, and outpatient
centers) [costs_total]
Net expenses for cost allocation, Total (sum of
reimbursable and nonreimbursable cost centers)
[net_expenses_total]
Net expenses for cost allocation, Administrative and
general [net_expenses_admin_and_general]
Inpatient costs (sum of 63 cost centers) [inpat_costs]
Inpatient costs (incl Medicare disallowed) (sum of 63
cost centers) [inpat_totcosts]
Outpatient costs (sum of 52 cost centers) [outpat_costs]
Outpatient costs (incl Medicare disallowed) (sum of 52
cost centers) [outpat_totcosts]
Cost-to-charge ratio, Subtotal (all inpatient, ancillary,
and outpatient centers) [ccr_subtotal]

30

Appendix 2: Relationship Between Hospital-Reported Net Income and Baseline
Model Net Income

Appendix 3: Relationship Between Critical Access Status and Percent Change in
Revenue
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Appendix 4: Relationship Between Rural Hospital Status and Percent Change in
Revenue

Appendix 5: Relationship Between For-Profit Ownership and Percent Change in
Revenue
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Appendix 6: Relationship Between Government Ownership and Percent Change in
Revenue

Appendix 7: Relationship Between Non-Profit Ownership and Percent Change in
Revenue
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Appendix 8: Relationship Between Teaching Hospital Status and Percent Change
in Revenue
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Appendix 9: Average Change in Hospital Revenue for Each State
State
KS
NE
ID
IA
MT
SD
OK
TX
PR
ND
CO
VT
LA
WY
DC
OR
ME
KY
MO
WA
VA
AR
NM
MD
AZ
MS

Change in Revenue
24.5%
23.1%
9.3%
6.7%
6.4%
2.8%
2.7%
1.5%
-0.6%
-0.8%
-1.1%
-1.5%
-1.6%
-3.1%
-3.2%
-4.6%
-5.5%
-6.1%
-6.5%
-6.5%
-7.2%
-7.3%
-7.4%
-8.0%
-10.0%
-11.0%

State
TN
WV
RI
FL
SC
WI
MA
MN
NJ
GA
DE
NY
NH
NC
MI
CA
IL
OH
IN
AL
NV
UT
CT
PA
HI
AK

Change in Revenue
-12.4%
-12.7%
-12.8%
-13.4%
-13.5%
-13.6%
-13.7%
-13.8%
-13.9%
-14.0%
-14.3%
-14.4%
-14.7%
-14.9%
-15.1%
-15.4%
-15.9%
-16.5%
-17.3%
-17.5%
-17.9%
-18.1%
-18.7%
-19.4%
-24.8%
-25.7%
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Appendix 10: Hospitals Without Reported Revenue from Patients

Villa Feliciana Medical Complex
Phs Indian Hospital At Rapid City - Sioux
San
Maniilaq Health Center
Kanakanak Hospital
P H S Indian Hospital-Ft Belknap At
Harlem - Cah
Cass Lake Indian Health Services Hospital
Parker Indian Health Center
Huhu Kam Memorial Hospital
P H S Indian Hospital Crow / Northern
Cheyenne
Hopi Health Care Center
Mt Edgecumbe Hospital
Kaiser Foundation Hospital Fontana
Kaiser Foundation Hospital - South Bay
Kaiser Foundation Hospital - Baldwin Park
Kaiser Foundation Hospital - Panorama City
Kaiser Foundation Hospital - Walnut Creek
Kaiser Foundation Hospital - Redwood City
Kaiser Foundation Hospital - Orange
County - Anahe
Kaiser Foundation Hospital - Fremont
Kaiser Foundation Hospital, Riverside
Kaiser Foundation Hospital - Woodland
Hills
Kaiser Foundation Hospital - San Francisco
Kaiser Foundation Hospital - Zion
Kaiser Foundation Hospital Manteca
Haxtun Hospital District
Kaiser Foundation Hospital
Kaiser Foundation Hospital - Downey
Kaiser Foundation Hospital-Santa Clara
Kaiser Foundation Hospital - South San
Francisco
Kaiser Foundation Hospital - West La
Kaiser Foundation Hospital-Santa Rosa

Kaiser Foundation Hospital-San Jose
Kaiser Foundation Hospital And Rehab
Center
Kaiser Foundation Hospital Oakland/Richmond
Kaiser Foundation Hospital - Los Angeles
Kaiser Foundation Hospital - Fresno
Kaiser Foundation Hospital - Sacramento
Kaiser Foundation Hosp So Sacramento
Kaiser Foundation Hospital-Moreno Valley
Southeastern Regional Medical Center
Cancer Treatment Centers Of America
Midwestern Region Med Center
Southwestern Regional Medical Center, Inc
Dhhs Usphs Indian Health Services
Sentara Rmh Medical Center
Houston Methodist Hospital
Lawton Indian Hospital
Sumner Regional Medical Center
Kaiser Foundation Hospital - San Leandro
Kaiser Foundation Hospital - Roseville
W W Hastings Indian Hospital
Santa Fe Phs Indian Hospital
Kaiser Foundation Hospital - Antioch
Jones Memorial Hospital
Kaiser Foundation Hospital - Vacaville
Choctaw Nation Health Services Authority
Standing Rock Indian Health Service
Hospital
Mescalero Phs Indian Hospital
Red Lake Hospital A
Phoenix Indian Medical Center
Sells Hospital
Cherokee Indian Hospital Authority
Chinle Comprehensive Health Care Facility
Zuni Comprehensive Community Health
Center
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Whiteriver Phs Indian Hospital
Claremore Indian Hospital
San Carlos Apache Healthcare
Tuba City Regional Health Care
Corporation
Fort Defiance Indian Hospital
Phs Indian Hospital At Eagle Butte
P H S Indian Hospital At Browning Blackfeet
Northern Navajo Medical Center
Chickasaw Nation Medical Center
Alaska Native Medical Center

Phs Indian Hospital At Rosebud
Gallup Indian Medical Center
Crownpoint Healthcare Facility
P H S Indian Hosp At Belcourt-Quentin N
Burdick
Yukon Kuskokwim Delta Reg Hospital
Choctaw Health Center
Whitfield Medical Surgical Hospital
Kaiser Foundation Hospital - Westside
Kaiser Foundation Hospital
Kaiser Sunnyside Medical Center
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Appendix 11: One-Way Sensitivity Analysis of Model Parameters

The tornado plot above shows how sensitive my main output, in this case “Median Change in
Net Income ($)” is to a 10% positive or 10% negative change for key model parameters. The
figure shows that the model is most sensitive to changes in the assumed Medicare payment, with
a baseline of 110% of current Medicare payments. The parameter with the least impact is the
reduction administrative and billing costs, with a 50% reduction as the baseline. The table below
provides additional documentation on how changes in parameters affect hospital net income.
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Iteration

Mean

St. Dev.

Min

Pctl(25)

Median

Pctl(75)

Max

Base Case

8,580,500

17,475,438

-65,684,451

-16,611,722

-3,897,402

1,404,373

41,815,025

1.1 * 110% of
Current
Medicare
Rates
0.9 * 110% of
Current
Medicare
Rates
1.1 * 2.41
(Commercial)
0.9 * 2.41
(Commercial)

-1,198,607

12,784,430

-38,130,498

-7,051,823

-189,536

5,371,887

35,765,121

-17,885,939

27,057,734

-106,727,834

-29,672,343

-8,587,429

-494,198

61,177,701

-10,791,144

20,218,939

-76,908,398

-20,051,826

-5,049,914

956,280

47,101,667

-6,030,476

14,892,234

-53,923,158

-12,628,972

-2,526,113

2,189,614

36,476,456

1.1 * .78
(Medicaid)
0.9 * .78
(Medicaid)
1.1 * .5
(Admin
Costs)
0.9 * .5
(Admin
Costs)

-9,967,160

18,703,633

-71,115,602

-18,213,543

-4,788,103

848,042

43,940,887

-7,038,967

16,597,887

-60,345,912

-14,611,296

-2,938,764

2,184,252

40,754,696

-7,696,587

16,795,777

-62,062,114

-15,110,657

-3,288,793

1,767,275

40,524,373

-9,450,818

18,369,895

-69,876,597

-17,773,887

-4,462,245

1,096,971

43,793,297
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